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Originally, hermeneutics was the interpretation of important texts. In the 19th century, herme-
neutics transformed into a science about the meaning and interpretation of all expressions. In 
the 20th century, Martin Heidegger radicalized hermeneutics, indicating that understanding 
(the essence of hermeneutics) is not a technical or intellectual operation, but a way of being. 
The central point of reference in the article is the hermeneutic philosophy of Hans-Georg 
Gadamer and Paul Ricœur. The central idea of Gadamer’s philosophy is understanding, which 
is connected with the so-called “rehabilitation of practical philosophy”. In such philosophy, 
the question concerning wisdom and thinking about the best possible way of life occupies an 
important place. Gadamer in his philosophy indicated the conditions of understanding. One 
of the main elements of his concept is hermeneutic experience, a negative experience, mean-
ing awareness of the finite nature of all understanding. Complementation of Gadamer’s con-
cept could be the hermeneutics of Paul Ricœur. He believed that there is not a correct method 
of interpretation and the best way to understand is the “conflict of hermeneutics”. Ricœure 
discerned two forms of hermeneutics: “hermeneutics of trust” and “hermeneutics of suspi-
cion”. The idea of hermeneutics is developed as an art of understanding, indicating the condi-
tions and possibilities of interpreting texts, symbols and metaphors. An interesting addition 
to the philosophy of Gadamer and Ricœur is Hans Blumenberg’s concept of metaphorology. 
He identified three basic positions of metaphors and the functions they perform: traditional, 
understanding a metaphor as inaccurate; pre-conceptual speech; and the unavoidable and ir-
replaceable nature of a metaphor. Under this concept lies the science of images through which 
man grasps himself and the world. Blumenberg explored the functions of various metaphors 
depicting truth (light, nudity), human life (sea travel, hiking, climbing) or the world (clock, 
machine, organism). Absolute metaphors, in addition to presenting the picture of the whole 
of reality, also play the role of orienting patterns, directing action. They contain certain value 
systems that determine attitudes, expectations, longings, interests, and indicate important or 
indifferent things or spheres, incline to certain actions or omissions. 
Keywords: hermeneutics, understanding, interpretation, prejudgments, hermeneutic experi-
ence, metaphor.
Originally, hermeneutics was a technical discipline connected with the interpreta-
tion of the Holy Scriptures, classical texts and law. Gradually its scope of influence and 
importance grew. In the 19th century thanks to the work of, among others, Friedrich 
Schleiermacher and Johann Droysen, hermeneutics transformed into a science about the 
meaning and interpretation of all expressions. Later, Wilhelm Dilthey expanded its scope, 
making hermeneutics the methodological basis of the humanities, and Martin Heidegger 
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universalized hermeneutics to a greater extent, indicating that understanding (the essence 
of hermeneutics) is not a technical or intellectual operation, but a way of being. Thus, 
he placed hermeneutics at the center of philosophical considerations. In contemporary 
hermeneutical thought, the philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricœur figures 
prominently. The central idea of Gadamer’s philosophy is understanding, which is con-
nected with the so-called “rehabilitation of practical philosophy”. In such philosophy, the 
question about wisdom and thinking about the best possible way of life plays a central 
role. One of the main tasks of philosophy understood in this manner is striving to achieve 
by understanding the most possible “proximity of things”, as Gadamer emphasizes — the 
Greek idea of truth as aletheia originally meant just “closeness to things” [1, p. 18]. Here 
the question arises: is the truth available to us in its full dimension? According to Gada- 
mer, this is rather the ideal goal, the horizon towards which we are heading, but we never 
achieve it because our understanding is always limited and imperfect. It is always based 
on some necessary initial assumptions and it is conditioned by the situation in which we 
find ourselves. We are always subject to the influence of the “effected history”. The essence 
of understanding, in Gadamer’s view, is hermeneutic experience: something that changes 
the thinking man, extends his horizon. Real experience is negative because it means a libe- 
ration from certain obviousness. This experience changes man, undermining his current 
knowledge about the world, but also knowledge about himself.
An important aspect of understanding is rooted in language. “Consciousness  — 
writes Gadamer — never faces the world, reaching — in a state out of language — for the 
tools of understanding. Our entire experience of the world, and in particular hermeneutic 
experience, develops from and within the language” [1, p. 59]. Knowledge is a form of 
interpretation, and any being that can be understood is a kind of language. Therefore, 
understanding as an interpretation can be considered as a variety of “reading in the book 
of the world”. Everything can be treated as a kind of text, and of course, it also applies 
to any images that we try to understand by interpreting them with the help of language 
[2, p. 332–334]. Gadamer emphasizes that understanding is always hypothetical: “Anyone 
who wants to understand a text always makes a certain project. He create a sense of the 
whole as soon as the first meaning is marked in the text and during understanding he is 
still revising it” [3, p. 271].
The same mechanism appears in all understandable relations with the world, both in 
the case of relationships with other people, and in the attempt to self-understand or un-
derstand the world. Each interpretation comes from the initial concepts, which are gradu-
ally replaced by more adequate concepts. Understanding is a continuous activity consist-
ing of continuous creation of subsequent projects and seeking confirmation in things. 
Developing accurate, adequate projects is a constant task of understanding, but it is an 
endless process, never concluding. Understanding is never complete or final — it is one of 
the ways in which human finitude makes itself felt. Furthermore, Gadamer points out that 
there is no other “objectivity” apart from confirming the preliminary idea by developing 
it. Of course, these initial projects may be better or worse, more or less adequate, but un-
derstanding then develops its proper possibility when the initial beliefs are not arbitrary. 
Therefore, when we are interpreting the text, we should try not to use the language of our 
own use, but to try to understand the text based on the use of language in the spirit of the 
author or the spirit of his time and culture. We fill the difference between our own use of 
language and the author’s way of understanding when we experience the resistance of the 
Вестник СПбГУ. Философия и конфликтология. 2021. Т. 37. Вып. 3 443
text, when the text “stops” us when we do not know what the author is actually saying. 
Then it is necessary to suspend the validity of our language usage. The problem of giving 
up, or at least modifying our language, is equally relevant to the content of our initial be-
liefs because the essence of understanding is not seeking confirmation of your own preju-
dices, but to hear what the text tells us. A necessary condition is openness to the view of 
another. As Gadamer writes: “Whoever wants to understand a text should accept what this 
text has to say to him. Therefore, hermeneutical consciousness must already be sensitive to 
the otherness of the text. Such sensitivity, however, does not presuppose either a content 
‘neutrality’ or, more importantly, self-liquidation, but it contains a conscious assimilation 
of one’s own preliminary beliefs and prejudices” [3, p. 273].
Self-conscious understanding must therefore not only make initial anticipations of 
meaning, but also make them aware in order to be able to control them. The dominance 
of unconscious prejudices means that we become deaf to the author who speaks to us, to a 
message that carries a text or image, and finally we become deaf to the voice of tradition. 
Gadamer believes that the model of hermeneutic understanding is conversation and it 
has the structure of questions and answers. When we try to interpret the text, we should 
behave as if it was an answer to a question. This becomes possible “thanks to obtaining 
a hermeneutic horizon. We recognize it now as the horizon of the question, the horizon 
within which the direction of the meaning of the text is determined. Whoever, therefore, 
wants to understand must go back with a question beyond what is said. He must under-
stand this as an answer to a basic question. So, going back to this, what is said, it necessa- 
rily goes beyond that” [3, p. 375].
Gadamer indicates the communicative and social character of statements, each state-
ment is already an answer and always refers to the underlying question, but both this 
answer and the question are always addressed to someone. Each statement has an ad-
dressee and its own situational horizon, an irremoveable feature of any statements is their 
historicity and finitude, because, like all human creations, they have their source in the 
history and finitude of human beings in general. He emphasizes that understanding is not 
just a reconstruction of a structure of meaning, but it always means an agreement: “To 
understand the past is — accordingly — to hear what it wants to tell us as truth. The pri-
macy of the question over the statement means in hermeneutics that every question that 
we understand is asked by ourselves” [4, p. 55].
Complementation of Gadamers concept could be Recœur’s hermeneutics . He “insists 
that human existance can be viewed only in the mirror of its external manifestations — 
the objects and acts, symbolized signs in which it is expressed  — and that immediate 
consciousness and self-consciousness, far from being transparent, can harbor illusions 
and mystification. Consequently, self-understanding must be mediated through the inter-
pretation and critique of the scattered signs of the self in the world” [5, p. 351]. He believed 
that “there is not a correct method of interpretation and the best way to understand is 
“conflict of hermeneutics”. Ricœur discerned two forms of hermeneutics: “hermeneutics 
of trust” and “hermeneutics of suspicion”. Hermeneutics of trust are aimed at “recollecting 
and restoring the fullness of meaning in symbolism”, and “hermeneutics of suspicion” are 
aimed at “reducing and demystifying symbolism by unmasking the aroved forces that are 
concealed within it” [5, p. 352].
The starting point of his deliberations on the problem of understanding is reflection 
on the consequences of transforming discourse from speech into writing, and thus into 
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the system of signs and text. Contrary to appearances, it means more than just consoli-
dating speech in some material, because the text receives independence from the author, 
becomes autonomous, and its meaning ceases to coincide with what the author wanted 
to say. As a result of this transformation, distance between the author’s world and the 
world of the text appears. In the autonomy of text, Ricœur sees the essential feature that 
provides the superiority of text over speech. Therefore, he emphasizes that “it is essential 
for a literary work, for a work of art in general, to go beyond the psychosocial conditions 
of its origin and to open itself to this endless sequence of readings, which themselves are 
embedded in various socio-cultural contexts. In short, both the psychological and the 
sociological position, the text should free itself from its context, so that it can then be put 
in a different context, in a new situation: and this is, says Ricœur, what the act of reading 
is doing” [6, p. 237].
This detachment from a specific context takes place not only on the part of the author, 
but also the recipient. Thanks to this, the text ceases to be addressed to a specific recipient, 
and it becomes addressed to everyone. The consequence of the autonomy of the text is the 
distance, which is not only constitutive for the text as a writing, but is also a condition of 
interpretation. Distance is not only a limitation, which understanding should overcome, 
but also a condition of understanding. Contrary to the Romantic tradition, Ricœur states 
that the relationship between interpretation and objectification is not so much opposi-
tional, but rather complementary. In the Romantic tradition, the hermeneutic task was to 
equate with the author, to understand his intention, meanwhile for Ricœur the main task 
of hermeneutics is related to the concept of the “world of text”.
The world of the text is a fictional world, but it is this irreducible dimension of the 
reference of fiction and literature that establishes the most fundamental hermeneutic 
problem because interpretation means to explain this kind of “being-in-the world” that 
is included in the text. What has to be interpreted in the text is a certain proposition of 
the world that could become ours, in which we could live “to incorporate one of these 
possibilities into our lives”. The text mediates in self-understanding, but unlike dialogue, 
the addressee of the text is not directly given, but it is “created, established by the work 
itself. The work designates its readers and thus creates its subjective addressee” [6, p. 243]. 
This raises the problem of adopting or applying, referring the text to the current situation 
of the reader. In the case of writing, the acquisition is of a special character, because it is 
related to the distance. Assimilation is mediated by all the structural objectivities included 
in the text. Ricœur highlights that: “Contrary to the tradition of the cogito and against the 
idea of the subject that he knew himself through direct intuition, it must be said that we 
understand ourselves only by taking an indirectly way among human signs preserved in 
the works of culture. What would we know about love and hate, about ethical feelings and, 
in general, about everything that we call ourselves, if it was not expressed and formulated 
by literature? Therefore, what seems to be the most contradictory to subjectivity and what 
structural analysis extracts as the mere textuality of the text is an indispensable medium 
through which we can only understand ourselves” [6, p. 243–244]. What we ultimately 
absorb is a proposal of the world, which the text shows and reveals. Therefore, to under-
stand means understanding oneself in the face of a text. It concerns exposure to the text, 
to obtain from it ourself “extended” by the proposition of existence corresponding in the 
most appropriate way to the proposal of the world presented in the work. Understanding 
is the way of constituting the “I” through the text.
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As Ricœur paradoxically claims, subjectivity obtains as much as it can suspend itself, 
as it can become unreal: “As a reader, says Ricœur, I find myself only when I’m lost. Read-
ing introduces me to the variations of the imagination proper to the ego. The rules of the 
game are such that the transformation of the world is at the same time a ludic transfor-
mation of the ego” (6, p. 244). Each text reveals a certain world. Interpreting a text means 
trying to learn the world designed by the text. Assimilation is the culminating moment of 
reading or the reception of a work of art. Interpretation concerns the ability of the work 
to reveal the world, and the reader’s relation to the text is a relation to the world that this 
work presents. Adoption is not so much an agreement, but rather a relation of under-
standing the world conveyed by a work, understanding is an extension of the “self through 
communing with the worlds proposed by the text” [6, p. 273].
Interpretation is a peculiar dialectic of distance, striving for the objectification of 
meaning and assimilation, which is an individual existential act. Assimilation means to 
make something mine that was previously “someone else’s”. According to the intention 
of this word, the goal of all hermeneutics is to overcome cultural distance and historical 
alienation. Interpretation connects, equates, modernises and makes similar. This purpose 
is achieved only to the extent that it updates the meaning of the work for the current re-
cipient. Acquiring is the proper term for updating the meaning of the message returned to 
someone. “Interpretation is complete when the act of reading triggers something on the 
shape of an event, an event of discourse occurring in the present tense. Like acquiring, the 
interpretation becomes an event” [6, p. 277]. The way of existence is to acquire a game that 
is a specific experience that transforms its participants. Although it needs participants to 
exist, in the game the player is not the master of the game, but a participant. The game has 
a dynamic character, it is a specific movement to and from, requiring active interaction. 
At the same time, the game has rules that limit the player and sets limits for him and the 
field of the game. In the game, nothing seems to be serious, but it reveals something real, 
thanks to the game something becomes visible, something can exist. Ricœur compares 
the interpretation of the text to the game in which the figure of the author appears, and 
we have the role of the reader. Successfully performing this role requires a reduction of 
“narcissism”, the desire to find only yourself in the text, to dominate. “Renunciation is the 
basic moment of assimilation and distinguishes it from all forms of “taking possession”. 
Acquiring is also and above all the consent to the independence of the text. Reading is a 
releasing assimilation… By letting go to what the text refers to, the ego frees itself from 
itself ” [6, p. 286]. According to Ricœur, the bond between assimilation and uncovering is 
the central idea of hermeneutics. Assimilation is a way of realizing and this is what Gada- 
mer referred to as the “melting of horizons”.
An important place in hermeneutic philosophy is occupied by reflection on symbolic 
thinking, especially on the place and role of metaphors in human thinking. Ricœur sees a 
metaphor “as an act of semantic impertinance, in which a lexicaly odd or foreign attribute 
is predicated to a subject: the result of the tension or interaction between the two terms is 
a new semantic pertinance, the creation of new meaning. In the creation of new meaning 
metaphor rediscribe reality” [5, p. 353].
An interesting supplement to his reflections on synbolic thinking and the role of 
metaphors in thinking is the concept of Hans Blumenberg’s metaphorology. He pointed 
out three basic positions on metaphors and the functions they perform. The first could 
be described as traditional. In traditional philosophy, the question about the meaning of 
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a metaphor is associated primarily with rhetoric. A metaphor is considered as an adorn-
ment of the language, although it does not extend the expression but makes it more at-
tractive. Another position is related to the understanding of metaphor as inaccurate, pre-
conceptual speech. The metaphorical approach is a prelude to a clear, conceptual approach 
to the problem. The transition from “metaphor to concept” is approached in a similar way 
like the transition from “myth to logos” [7, p. 10]. The third position enhances the meta-
phor, pointing to its unavoidable and irreplaceable nature as forms of thinking, a meta-
phor provides abstract thinking, devoid of sensory data, intuitions taken from the world 
of phenomena. Furthermore, as Hannah Arendt writes: “All philosophical concepts are 
metaphors, petrified analogies, and their real sense is revealed when we reach into their 
original context, which enlivened the mind of a philosopher who uses these concepts for 
the first time” [8, p. 157].
This third way of thinking about a metaphor is presented by Blumenberg in his con-
cept of metaphorology as a reflection on the images through which man is trying to un-
derstand the world and his place in this world. The basic subject of his reflections about the 
place and function of metaphors are “absolute metaphors”. Blumenbeerg emphasizes their 
explanatory function. “Absolute metaphors answer the most basic questions, for which we 
do not have “scientific” answers, but at the same time it is not possible to eliminate them 
because it is not that we put them, but rather we find them embedded in the foundations 
of our life” [7, p. 19]. Blumenberg divides these questions into theoretical questions on the 
whole and pragmatic, which he also describes as orientating, because they determine the 
directions of action. Absolute metaphors have an explanatory and directional function. 
The theoretical function consists of delineating the whole horizon. Absolute metaphors 
depict the whole picture by structuring it. Blumenberg believes that by starting from ab-
solute metaphors depicting a certain picture of the world and man, certain consequences 
can be derived that mark the historically changing horizon of meaning. Absolute meta-
phors occur not only in mythical thinking, metaphysics or philosophy, but also in science.
Blumenberg reflects on the role of various metaphors in culture, such as the metaphor 
of truth (for instance light, nudity) or human life (like sea voyage, wandering or climbing). 
Another basic question, in addition to the question about truth, man or life, is the ques-
tion about the world: what is it? There have been various answers provided: it is a polis, 
a city, a living being, a theater, a clock, a machine. Jean Paul in Auswahl aus der Teufels 
Papieren replied to this question as follows:
I will never regret being able, as good as possible, as good as it is allowed, to teach everyone 
here what the world really is. It can be a dead end in a big city of God or just a provincial city 
compared to other planets. It is a children’s sidewalk or trolley of humanity who wants to teach 
human how to walk. Maybe it is… something behind the scenes and changing room to another 
world, in which we will play our roles not without applause. Or there is a dark chamber (camera 
obscura) in which the ray brings and paints the inverted and compressed pictures of the more 
beautiful chamber; <…> or it is a counter of an invisible denominator; or maybe is it nearly noth-
ing? [7, p. 25–26]
Absolute metaphors do not indicate any detailed relationships present in reality, but 
most importantly they provide a picture of the whole. In addition to presenting the image 
of reality as a whole, they also function as certain patterns that play an approximate, direc-
tional, role. They contain certain systems of values that determine attitudes, expectations, 
longings, interests and indicate things or indifferent spheres, induce some actions or omis-
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sions. The history of human culture perceived through the prism of absolute metaphors 
makes us realize that from the very beginning, we humans are still struggling with these 
simple, naive questions: from where? where to? for what? Unfortunately, all the answers, 
even if at the beginning they pretend to be objective, rational or scientific, upon a closer 
look end up being another story easing the pain of existence. The Hermeneutic reason that 
allows us to understand this, ultimately, turns out to be very close to Socratic wisdom as 
an awareness of human finiteness.
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Основным ориентиром в  статье является герменевтическая философия Ханса-Геор-
га Гадамера и Поля Рикёра. Центральная идея философии Гадамера — понимание, ко-
торое связано с так называемой реабилитацией практической философии. В такой фи-
лософии очень важное место занимают вопрос о мудрости и размышления о наилуч-
шем образе жизни. Гадамер в своей философии указывает условия понимания. Одним 
из основных элементов его концепции является герменевтический опыт, негативный 
опыт, означающий осознание конечности всего понимания. Дополнением концепции 
Гадамера может быть герменевтика П. Рикёра, который считал, что «нет правильно-
го метода интерпретации», и лучший способ понять — это «конфликт герменевтики». 
Рикёр различает две формы герменевтики: «герменевтика доверия» и «герменевтика 
подозрения» и развивает идею герменевтики как искусства понимания, указывая на 
условия и возможности интерпретации текстов, символов и метафор. Интересным до-
полнением к философии Гадамера и Рикёра является концепция метафорологии Хан-
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са Блюменберга, указавшего на три основные позиции в отношении метафор и функ-
ций, которые они выполняют: традиционную; понимающую метафору как неточную, 
доконцептуальную речь; указывающую на неизбежную и  незаменимую природу ме-
тафоры. Под этой концепцией метафорологии лежит наука об образах, с  помощью 
которых человек схватывает себя и мир. Блюменберг исследует функции различных 
метафор, которые изображают правду (свет, нагота), человеческую жизнь (морские 
путешествия, походы, скалолазание) или мир (часы, машина, организм). Абсолют-
ные метафоры, помимо представления картины всей реальности, также играют роль 
ориентировочных ориентиров, направляющих действие. Они содержат определенные 
системы ценностей, которые устанавливают отношения, ожидания, стремления, инте-
ресы и указывают на важные или безразличные вещи или сферы, склоняются к опре-
деленным действиям или упущениям.
Ключевые слова: герменевтика, понимание, интерпретация, предрассудки, герменевти-
ческий опыт, метафора.
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